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The analysis will be focused on the comprehension of citizenship rights in terms of
how citizenship rights were translated into practice and were perceived by its citizens and
residents. An analysis of citizenship rights approached within a democratic framework does
not only consist of legal mechanisms but also of a political culture which respects diversity
between us and them. This type of political culture did not prevail in Lithuania in the period
of 1988 to 1993. This was a period which saw the rise of nationalism, the development of
nationalistic behaviour towards the national minorities. It, therefore, produces a tension be-
tween citizenship as an inclusive principle and nationalism as an exclusive one. It was only
after 1993 that finally the more conciliatory policies were introduced towards national mi-
norities.
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Introduction
The study of national movements and citizenship rights is vital because of their impact
on the evolution of both state and society in Eastern Europe. Citizenship became the most
salient political issue with the re-establishment of state independence. Whilst citizenship is
based on the concept of the individual, the individual is also a member of different communi-
ties, and it is sometimes only as a member of the community that the individual is able to
claim and exercise his/her rights. Citizenship is a goal which could be best reached through
collective action in which all members of society regardless of their nationality, should be
able to take part. It is politically determined because the state decides who may or may not
be a citizen. However, this decision does not always have a democratic base and excludes
people according to their race, ethnicity, religion etc.
Both citizenship and nationalism are based on the concept of membership in a commu-
nity. As such citizenship and nationalism vary according to the inclusive or exclusive nature
of their membership. In the newly independent Lithuania there emerged an increasing ten-
sion between citizenship and nationalism. Whereas citizenship was defined in inclusive
terms, nationalism became increasingly exclusive. The Lithuanian national movement, Sa-
judis based its identity on the struggle for independence and on a claim of restoring the
“democratic tradition of the inter-war period”. Its struggle for an independent democratic
Lithuania was shaped by the affirmation of Lithuanian national identity. This was interpreted
by some Russian, Poles and Jews (as well as Lithuanians) not only as contrary to the develop-
ment of their own national identities but also as a form of exclusion from the fulfilment of
citizenship rights which they were given according to the letter of the law.1
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1 According to the 1989 Population Census there were 20,4% of national minorities in the total po-
pulation of Lithuania; 9,4% of Russians, 7% of Poles and 0,3% of Jews. For more detailed analysis of
Lithuanian national minorities see: V. Popovski (2000) National Minorities and Citizenship Rights: A
Case-Study of Lithuania from 1988 to 1993. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
The analysis will be focused on the comprehension of citizenship rights in terms of how
citizenship rights were translated into practice and were perceived by its citizens and resi-
dents. In other words, citizenship should not only be seen in relation to the state but also at
the local level which gives it depth and vitality.2 An analysis of citizenship rights approached
within a democratic framework does not only consist of legal mechanisms but also of a politi-
cal culture which respects (if not celebrates) diversity between us and them. This type of po-
litical culture did not prevail in Lithuania in the period of 1988 to 1993. This was a period
which saw the rise of nationalism, the development of nationalistic behaviour towards the na-
tional minorities. It, therefore, produces a tension between citizenship as an inclusive princi-
ple and nationalism as an exclusive one. It was only after 1993 that finally the more concilia-
tory policies were introduced towards them.
Citizenship, Democracy, Nationalism, National Movement
Citizenship is often viewed as a struggle from below. According to Sidney Tarrow histor-
ically, “Citizenship emerged through a rough dialectic between movements – actual and
feared – and the national state.”3 Our present experience teaches us that this is still very
much applicable. Citizenship is not a static notion, it is a relationship between individuals, so-
cial groups, civil society and the state. It can also be seen as an attempt to change the existing
power relations. Therefore, it could be seen as an important category which provides seeds
for a (new type of) democracy. National movements, nowadays, also subscribe to democracy
by often couching citizenship in national terms. But this raises the question: could citizenship
be comfortable wearing ethnic clothes?
Citizenship rights are enjoyed only if people/members are able to benefit from them
comprehensively. The argument that highlights that citizenship rights are enjoyed only if
people/members are able to benefit from them comprehensively is important for an analysis
of citizenship not only as individual rights but also as collective rights. The issue is whether
the members of a community should be defined purely in terms of an individuals or whether
they should also be recognised as members of a group. Furthermore, collective rights as the
only way to protect some ethnic groups has recently been put on the agenda, especially in the
former Yugoslavia. This issue has great relevance to the situation of the Poles, who are
mostly concentrated in the south-east of Lithuania, some of whom demanded various forms
of collective rights.
In the contemporary period, democracy became “more or less universally popular”.4 I
would argue that democracy in the contemporary period can not be simply seen in terms of
government by means of party competition, majority rule and the rule of law, as is usually the
case in East European societies. John Keane rightly points out that a new concept of democ-
racy is not simply representative democracy, but it represents a striving to be open-minded,
uncompromisingly pluralist, cosmopolitan and historically informed.5 Alberto Melucci argues
that “It would be illusory to think that democracy consists merely in the competition for ac-
cess to governmental resources. Democracy in complex societies requires conditions which
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2 Local level is used in the sense of maintaining autonomy and space within which to pursue new
initiative. It means that one has to take into account both a geographic area and social relations which
are constituted there. When it comes to ethnic community certain place gets a subjective dimension -it
gets a particular value.
3 S. Tarrow (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 76.
4 A. Giddens (1994) Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Cambridge: Polity
Press, p. 104.
5 J. Keane (1988) Democracy and Civil Society. London: Verso, p. X.
enable individuals and social groups to affirm themselves and to be recognised for what they
are or wish to be.”6
Bearing in mind this tradition I would argue that democracy as a political system should
highlight the following principles; plurality, difference and heterogeneity. If the state is based
upon these principles this means that it is ready to acknowledge differences in every-day life,
in our case differences among national minorities and majority, as well as differences within
national minorities. This also means that the state is able to guarantee an independent space
in which civil society can function. This space is important because it allows for collective ac-
tion to be developed, for different political projects to be put on the agenda and debated
openly, according to democratic rules. Civil society is also important because of its influence
on the state and its institutions as well as on the market and its institutions. Influence is the
critical tool of civil society. Civil society does not have any formal power, although its influ-
ence can change power relations. Formal power lies mostly with the state.
Our understanding of citizenship as a dynamic principle highlights the importance of
seeing it as a place of struggle for rights. That struggle takes place not only in state institu-
tions but also involves non-state institutions. Civil society is dependent on a state that guar-
antees the existence of an independent space. Civil society is a place of pluralism, a place
which allows different types of non-state activities to blossom. Furthermore, civil society has
to evaluate the transparency and accountability of the state, the market and their institu-
tions.7 Finally, the functioning of a civil society should not prevent the state from fulfilling its
role.8 In the case of Lithuania, national minorities were guaranteed rights as individuals. As
argued later, they were not satisfied with some parts of Lithuanian legislation as well as with
the possibility to exercise their rights. Therefore, they started to form different types of or-
ganisations to be able to challenge the Lithuanian legislation. They needed an independent
space to learn to formulate their needs and the state had to learn to guarantee that space. In
the case of Lithuania, the power relations influenced Lithuanian civil society and as a result
the national agenda dominated this space.
The understanding of the state in Eastern European societies can be best described by a
logic based on Gyorgy Konrad’s analysis of the totalitarian state; to live with the totalitarian
state was possible only if one ignored it. In Eastern Europe the very idea of civil society
meant exclusion from the state influence. This type of “relationship” based on animosity en-
ables civil society to develop parallel institutions, such as cultural, environmental and reli-
gious movements.9 Zbigniew Rau goes a step further and claims that this approach to civil
society enabled most of the “Easterners” to argue that civil society was founded upon na-
tional consciousness.10 They saw nationalism as encouraging the existence of all different
types of social movements ranging from environmentalist to homosexuals, from human rights
activists to rock-music fans.
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6 A. Melucci (1989) Nomads of the Present. London, Hutchinson Radious, p. 172.
7 I would agree with Jean Cohen, that it is important to highlight that civil society should be seen
not only in relation to the state but also to the economy. J. Cohen (1995) Interpreting the Notion of Civil
Society, in: M. Waltzer, ed., Towards a Global Civil Society. Oxford: Berghahn Books, p. 36.
8 J. A. Hall (1995) In Search of Civil Society, in: J. A. Hall, ed. Civil Society: Theory, History, Com-
parison. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 16.
9 See also: R. Dahrendorf (1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. London: Chatto and
Windus, pp. 95–97.
10 J. Luik (1991) Intellectuals and Their Two Paths to Restoring Civil Society in Estonia, in Z. Rau,
ed., The Emergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Boulder, Col.: Westwiev
Press, pp. 77–93; M. Ryabchuk (1991) Civil Society and National Emancipation: The Ukrainian Case, in:
Z. Rau, ed., pp. 95–112.
Two issues are of interest to us. One is connected with the statement that civil society
was founded upon national consciousness and the other discusses democracy as the only via-
ble solution for Eastern Europe. Civil society did not exist in the former Soviet Union be-
cause, as an intrinsic aspect of the system, the state could not guarantee an independent and
public space.11 However, private space was of major importance in opposing the “real-exist-
ing socialism”. Opposition groups challenged the existing order but their opinions were si-
lenced by the government. However, the public was aware of their existence, not least be-
cause of government reports about “enemies within our own people”. Even if we can not ac-
knowledge the existence of civil society we still have to take into account that elements for its
existence were there; people who were prepared to challenge the state and society in which
they lived.
Glasnost (a policy introduced from above) entailed the opportunity to go a step further
and allow for the possibility of forming a space in which social movements would be able to ex-
ist. However, it has to be recognised that glasnost did not financially support social movements.
Furthermore, the Communist Party supported socialist views which did not undermine the ex-
istence of communism. Therefore, it created conditions for a possibility of “movement surro-
gacy”.12 In Lithuania, for example, the anti-nuclear movement worded its opposition to the nu-
clear power station Ignalina, in enviromental terms. What is even more interesting for our ar-
gument is that “Though the Zemyna club continued to exist and participate in anti-nuclear ac-
tivities, most of its active members shifted their attention to Sajudis, and it was Sajudis that or-
ganised future mass actions against the Ignalina station.”13 This should not be interpreted in
terms of as there being a lack of genuine interest in the environment. The environment was
seen in natural terms as well as in national terms. Environmental activists called the Lithuanian
population to protect their own identity and their own nation. Ideas around nationhood and
statehood infused movements which were given, though not guaranteed, a space to challenge
the state on non-political issues. As a result civil society which, in theory, should be open to
each individual was shaped by anti-Soviet and Lithuanian national ideologies. Nijole
Lomaniene argues that social reality turned into a highly ritualised space.14
The second issue involves statehood understood as a demand for a democratic as well
as independent state. Within Lithuanian society, there was considerable interest in events in
Western Europe and the USA whose governments celebrated their own liberal democracies
and proclaimed the “end of history”. In the West there has been a constant dialogue between
political scientists who defend and those who oppose liberal democracy. Even those who op-
pose this system argue that “We must admit, following Bobbio, that only a liberal state can
guarantee the basic rights without which the democratic game cannot take place. We should
also agree with Bobbio that the struggle for democracy is the struggle against autocratic
power in all forms.”15 The major problem with the liberal tradition is that it sees the citizen
as an abstract individual and no account is taken of sex, race, ethnicity etc.
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11 E. Gellner (1994) Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. Penguin.
12 J. I. Dawson (1996) Eco-nationalism: Anti-nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lit-
huania and Ukraine. London: Duke University Press, p. 6.
13 Ibid., p. 51. The Zemyna Club was founded in the late 1987 and described itself as an “indepen-
dent environmental association”. Zemyna is the Goddess of the Earth in the Lithuanian pagan mytho-
logy. The chairperson of the Zemyna Club, Zigmas Vaisvila, became the Chaiperson of the Ecological
Committee of Sajudis in June 1988.
14 N. Lomaniene (1994) On Lithuanian Nationalism: The Movement and the Concept, in: N. Lo-
maniene and M. P. Saulauskas, eds., Social Change, vol. 1. Vilnius: Independent Institute for Social Re-
search, p. 29.
15 Ch. Mouffe (1995) Pluralism and the Left Identity, in: M. Waltzer, ed., Towards a Global Civil
Society. Oxford: Berghahn Books, p. 296.
The western neo-liberal system clearly pointed out that the free-market economy can
represent a danger to solidarity, social justice and autonomy. That model, in its different
variations, was implemented in Eastern Europe and also in Lithuania. In Lithuania it defi-
nitely did not encourage solidarity, social justice and autonomy. In conjunction with national-
ism, sponsored by the state, it fuelled hatred, especially against Russians. I would often hear
the following sentence, “Whilst we fought for independence, Russians withdrew into the eco-
nomic sphere and now run our economy.” Needless to say there was no solidarity with Rus-
sian workers when the large-scale factories were closed down and Russians made redundant.
Therefore, it is important to analyse how a national movement relates to proposals for
equal citizenship, political democratisation, social justice, respect towards different types of
groups, including national minorities.
Different theories of nationalism share an understanding of the importance of self-gov-
ernance or independence. In Eastern Europe this claim for independence is based upon un-
derstanding that each single nation shares: “(i) a ‘memory’ of some common past, treated as
a ‘destiny’ of the group-or at least of its core constituents; (ii) a density of linguistic or cul-
tural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group beyond it; (iii) a
conception of equality of all members of the group organised as a civil society.”16 The issues
of memory, language and equality have been vital issues in Eastern Europe. Memory is ori-
ented towards the past but its main purpose is to enter into the present and future. Language
(of the majority nation within a state) is a vital ethnic marker which distinguishes us from
them. Equality is a civic marker and the result of the commitment to democracy. However,
this commitment (like the other two issues) can have boundaries. As a result one’s remem-
bering is selective and chooses only certain events from the past or certain interpretations of
these events. Language is often defined in relation the language of the other or others. Equal-
ity relates to respecting an individual as a member of a community but the community could
be defined in ethnic terms. Even when it is legally defined in civic terms the lack of demo-
cratic political culture can unable the implementation of the letter of the law.
The Rise of Sajudis
Alan Touraine argues that national movements are characterised by the feature of “set-
ting an alternative agenda of historical action”.17 Their aim is to re-organise the state struc-
ture and gain control over a certain territory to be able to fulfil their agenda. For a national
movement to be successful, the following processes should take place: a crisis of legitimacy
linked to social, moral and cultural strains, vertical social mobility among non-dominant eth-
nic group, high level of social communication including literacy, schooling and market rela-
tions and nationally relevant conflict of interests.18 I understand national movements as a
challenge to the existing order, even when they do not define themselves in political terms of
secession and independence. To understand national movements, organisational structures
have to be analysed-the leadership and the core members, the larger segment of
sympathisers, the movement-produced organisations, and the organisations and institutions
externally supporting the movement and/or pursuing related goals.19
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16 M. Hroch (1993) From National Movements to Fully-Fledged Nations. New Left Review,
no.198, p. 5.
17 Quoted in: R. Szporluk (1989) Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism, Problems of Communism, vol.
38, no. 4, p. 35.
18 M. Hroch (1993), p. 12.
19 R. J. Dalton, M. Kuechler and W. Buerklin (1990) The Challenge of New Movements; in: R. J.
Dalton and M. Kuechler, eds., Challenging the Political Order. Cambridge: Cambridge, Polity Press, pp.
3–20.
It could be argued that Sajudis was an umbrella organisation which was founded by
the Lithuanian intelligentsia. It attracted people and movements with different agendas
who were ready to give up their immediate concerns in the struggle for Lithuanian inde-
pendence. Therefore, for the purposes of our analysis, I would argue that there are two im-
portant issues: the relationship of ethnic groups towards the state and the efforts of these
ethnic groups to re-organise the state. Ethnic groups see themselves as being culturally dis-
tinct from other groups within the same state. They also argue that their distinctiveness is
not acknowledged. Therefore, they demand that the state needs to be re-organised along
the lines of cultural autonomy which could lead towards federation or confederation and
towards secession, in the case where ethnic groups live in a compact territory. In the case of
Lithuania, Sajudis claimed that Lithuanian identity was suppressed during the Soviet era.
This led them to demand sovereignty for Lithuania in 1988 and was responsible for the
Sajudis willingness to let the Lithuanian Freedom League challenge the Soviet Lithuania
with a demand for independence. The movement looked for the support of the national mi-
norities of Lithuania, and was indeed given support by some members of these communi-
ties. In Eastern Europe the aim of the majority of nationalist movements was a na-
tion-state. The nation-state is not only a territorial organisation (with defined and fixed
boundaries) but it is also a membership organisation.20 National movements define this
membership in ethnic or civic terms.
Citizens of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania were invited “onto the stage of
history” by the Lithuanian national movement, Sajudis, but the movement turned nationalis-
tic especially after its Second Congress in April 1990, and as a result the praxis of citizenship
was not encouraged. Individuals saw themselves or were forced to see themselves as Lithua-
nian, Polish, Russian etc. Citizenship is, in the last instance, a result of a political decision and
that decision in Lithuania was based on the “zero-option” or on the inclusive principle. Citi-
zens of Lithuania were guaranteed equal rights but citizenship is not only, as argued above,
about rights. Whilst important to begin with, citizenship is a dynamic principle that should
entail learning to live with differences and provide for them. Citizenship needs institutional
support which teaches tolerance towards different cultures. This institutional support did not
exist always in Lithuania.21
Sajudis was, at the beginning, a movement which united Kaunas nationalists, Vilnius lib-
eral intellectuals and reform communists.22 Its aim was Lithuanian independence, although it
used the language of sovereignty.23 Therefore, it behaved like an umbrella organisation, em-
bracing all those who were in support of their main goal. This goal was achieved just a month
before the Second Congress of Sajudis. According to the participants, the atmosphere in the
congress corridors began to be increasingly nationalistic. Sajudis had created a conflict
around the question: who is a real, proper Lithuanian? Furthermore, it claimed that it knew
the answer, which consisted of uniting under the national flag for the sake of a “brighter” fu-
ture. This congress made a considerable number of Vilnius liberal intellectuals and reform
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20 R. Brubaker (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, p. XI.
21 V. S. Vardys and J. B. Sedaitis (1997) Lithuania: The Rebel Nation. Boulder, Col.: Westview
Press, p. 221.
22 Interview with A. Juozaitis, 11 December 1992. He was a philosopher who left Sajudis in 1991 to
form the Future Forum (together with other well known former members of Sajudis such as, for exam-
ple, Kazimiera Prunskiene), a political association which was vocal in its critic of. The so-called Kaunas
faction in the struggle for independence against the Soviet rule, pushed for Kaunas to be given again the
status of Lithuanian capital because it is “the pure home of the race”.
23 N. Lomaniene (1994), p. 28.
communist leave the movement.24 They felt uncomfortable with policies that divided the
population into ‘patriots’ and ‘communists’. This meant that Sajudis was now made up pre-
dominantly of right-wing Kaunas nationalists.25 Their rhetoric turned more and more nation-
alistic.
This shift towards a nationalistic attitude had major implications for the national minor-
ities.26 In relation to national minorities, Sajudis argued that the Poles in the South-East of
Lithuania were manipulated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and it was this that
lay behind their demand for autonomy in September 1989. This demand was interpreted as
an attempt to secede and join the Soviet Union in May 1990. Anti-Soviet attitudes began to
envolve into anti-Russian and anti-Polish attitudes. Sajudis argued that the Soviet blockade,
which was enforced in April 1990, showed that the communists were prepared to reverse the
pace of change and negotiate with Gorbachev.27 Kazimiera Prunskiene, the Prime Minister,
was prepared to talk to Gorbachev and persuaded Landsbergis to implement a moratorium
on independence on 23 June 1990.
The moratorium again fuelled the right-wing section in Sajudis to maintain their distinc-
tion between us and them, ‘patriots’ who are for independence and ‘communists’ who are
ready to negotiate with Moscow. Prunskiene was “charged” with having connections with the
KGB during the Soviet era. In autumn 1990 there was a reshuffle in the Soviet Government
which brought hard-liners to power. This fuelled nationalistic rhetoric even further. People
whom I interviewed even referred to this in term of ‘hysteria’. On 11 January 1991
Gorbachev ordered the Soviet troops to take over Lithuania. In the second part of January,
Lithuania was united, but only temporarily. Pruskiene and Arvydas Juozaitis joined forces
and formed the Future Forum in April 1991, together with quite a few former members of
Sajudis and members of the LDDD, such as Gediminas Kirkilas. This was an attempt to gen-
erate an opposition to Landsbergis and Sajudis. Its meetings were attacked not only verbally
but also with petrol bombs and stones. The failed August 1991 coup brought international
recognition to Lithuania but the nationalistic attitude stayed. It was regenerated by the open-
ing of the KGB archives, which occured in spite of the fact that the leader of the right-wing
section of Sajudis, Virgilijus Cepaitis, was the first individual to be found “guilty”.28
In the months before the Third Congress, held in December 1991, all the attention was
turned towards Landsbergis.29 He saw himself as the ‘Father of the Nation’, a title that had
been used by Lithuanian inter-war president Antanas Smetona. Present was oriented towards
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24 Interview with L. Bielinis, 6 November 1992. According to my interviews 13 out of 35 members
of the National Council elected in 1988 withdrew from politics up to the period of the Second Congress
of the Sajudis mostly because they were not satisfied with its nationalistic orientation. Bielinis was a
member of the Party of the Centre and a political scientist.
25 It is difficult to judge if Landsbergis changed because of the pressure from the right or because
he himself realised that the right-wing ideology could fulfil his ambitions. I would agree with Lieven that
right-wing ideology could allow him to fulfil his ideal to be the Father of the Nation.
26 I base my analysis of these events on my interviews. See also: A. Lieven (1994) The Baltic Revo-
lution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.
214–263. V. S. Vardys and J. B. Sedaitis (1997) Lithuania: The Rebel Nation. Boulder, Col.: Westview
Press, p. 152.
27 The Soviet blockade was imposed on Lithuania in April 1990 as a result of the Lithuanian deci-
sion to declare independence. Lithuania was sealed off and its economy suffered. See: V. S. Vardys and J.
B. Sedaitis (1997), p. 166.
28 Ibid., (1997), 195.
29 “A Lithuanian Army officer grumbled: On Monday, you turn on the television – Landsbergis. On
Tuesday, you turn on the radio – Landsbergis. On Wednesday. you open the newspaper – Landsbergis.
On Thursday, you are afraid to open a tin of fish!” A. Lieven (1994), p. 258.
past and the past was turned into a myth highlighting the importance of one man, who was
seen as Father of the Lithuanian Nation and State. Landsbergis was always surrounded with
Lithuanian national symbols and this symbolism reached its peak during the Congress. The
Third Congress of Sajudis is officially remembered as being Landsbergis’ attempt at restitu-
tion of the presidency.30 Juozaitis argued that “great Sajudis turned into a pioneer organisa-
tion of the old Soviet times”.31 This Congress is also remembered for Landsbergis’s refusal to
outline a programme. “Stressing certain priorities will be similar to a programme. These
should be honest work, family and native land.”32 Again when it came to congress corridors
and the backstage, there was a constant attack on the former communists and, in relation to
this, national minorities.33 The De-Sovietization Law was discussed with the aim of driving all
former communists out of power. It was especially aimed against Brazauskas. The ‘hysteria’
against communism and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) reached its peak at
this time. Foreign relations with CIS were non-existant. “If Sajudis’ first phase was academic
anti-communism, this was the phase of militant anti-communism.”34 Juozaitis called the latter
phase “national socialism”.35 If Sajudis’ three congresses were seen as three steps backward
by the LDDP Deputy Leader, the 20th Communist Party Congress in December 1989 was
seen not as a step forward but as a step out of the entrenched circle defined by the Soviet
communist ideology.36 Despite losing the 1990 elections and, in the period 1990–1992 33 out
of 40 MPs,37 the LDDP consolidated itself and began to oppose the Sajudis policies of con-
flict and differentiation. As a result, it won the 1992 elections. According to Ozolas, one ex-
planation for the LDDP popularity and the 1992 election victory was the widely felt need to
avoid conflicts.38 National minorities differed in their approach to the LDDP victory as it is
analysed later.39 Some of them were happy to see the demise of Sajudis and argued that the
current situation could not get any worse. Others were ready to wait and see what the LDDP
would do for Lithuanian national minorities.
The 1992 election result should not only be seen as a LDDP victory but also as a judge-
ment on the Sajudis reign. Both Lithuanians and national minorities hoped that the LDDP
would tone down the nationalistic rhetoric. The Poles acknowledged that the LDDP had
made positive first steps in implementing legislation concerning minority rights, especially
the use of minority languages in public offices. The majority of Russians I interviewed were
disappointed because in their opinion LDDP did not have a policy on national minorities. All
of them admitted that there was less pressure on the minorities after the 1992 elections but
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30 FBIS-SOV-91-241, 17 December 1991, p. 36.
31 Golos Litvi: Zerkalo Litovskoi Presi, 11–17 November 1992, p. 4.
32 A. Lieven (1994), p. 258.
33 According to V. S. Vardys (1965) it should be pointed out that the procentage of Russians in the
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the Lithuanian Communist Party were non-Lithuanians. V. S. Vardys (1990), p. 77.
34 Interview with L. Bielinis, 6 November 1992.
35 Interview with A. Juozaitis, 11 December 1992.
36 Interview with G. Kirkilas, 23 November 1992. He was Deputy Leader of the Lithuanian Demo-
cratic Party (LDDP).
37 A. Lieven (1994), p. 239. V. S. Vardys and J. B. Sedaitis (1997), p. 155.
38 Interview with R. Ozolas, 27 November 1992. He was a founder and Leader of the Party of the
Centre, a philosopher and publisher.
39 In the 1992–1996 Lithuanian Parliament there were 6 Poles, 3 Russians and 1 Jew. From a docu-
ment Breakdown of Deputies by Nationality, given to me in November 1992 in the Lithuanian Parlia-
ment.
at the same time there was still no dialogue. The Jews were satisfied with the willingness of
the LDDP government to address the issue of the Holocaust. However, the only forum in
which minority issues were raised was in the Government.40 Otherwise there was “silence”.
The national minorities were not prepared to collaborate against this silence. They argued
that their circumstances differed and that there was a need to raise awareness about specific
issues amongst their respective communities.
Responses from National Minorities
The majority of Russians who stayed in Lithuania wanted to continue living there.41
They were becoming increasingly aware that it was their responsibility to find their place and
role within the new Lithuanian state and civil society. They were slowly becoming actively in-
volved in identifying their problems, proposing solutions and raising money to finance their
activities. However, they also wanted more support from the Lithuanian authorities towards
their specific needs as a national minority. The Lithuanian legislation did not grant collective
rights to national minorities.42 Citizens were only able to exercise rights as individuals. In Will
Kymlicka’s terms, Russians wanted “polyethnic rights” to be put into practice and re-
spected.43 However there were differences among Russians as to how these rights were inter-
preted, as individual or collective rights. Some of them, defining themselves as a disadvan-
taged group primarily because of the way the legislation was implemented, argued that only
through a group would they be able to “amplify their voices”.44 This was made clear by a
group of Russians from Visaginas who wanted “their difference to be acknowledged”.45 Nei-
ther group of Russians supported the other types of rights discussed by Kymlicka (“self-gov-
ernment rights” and “special representation rights”46) because they argued that there was no
need for them because they were widely scattered throughout Lithuania, mostly in urban
centres.
The Poles indicated, in Kymlicka’s terms, that they needed “polyethnic” and “special
representation rights”. They needed these rights as a group, not only as individuals. They
were afraid that the bias towards the Lithuanian language and culture would undermine po-
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41 According to the 1989 Census 49.7 percent of Russians who lived in Lithuania were born there,
37.6 percent in Russia, 3.1 percent in Belarus and 3 percent in Ukraine and 6.7 percent in other repu-
blics of the former Soviet Union. Lietuvos respublikos gyventoju demografine statistika (tautiniu aspek-
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42 Tamara Resler argues that emphasis on multiculturalism should be regarded as guarantees of
rights of national communities. T. J. Resler (1997) Dilemmas of Democratisation: Safeguarding Minori-
ties in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 1, p. 101.
43 “Polyethnic rights” are understood as legal protection and financial support for cultural and
educational purposes. W. Kymlicka (1995) Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 30
44 Between 1990 and 1995 the formulation of international standards regulating state conduct to-
wards national minorities was a priority for European organisations. They agreed that minority rights
should be based in an individual. The only exception was the 1992 Council of Europe Charter for Regio-
nal and Minority Languages. See: J. J. Preece (1997) National Minority Rights vs. State Sovereignty in
Europe: Changing Norms in International Relations. Nations and Nationalism, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 345–364.
45 Interview with E. Petrov(as), 25 June 1993. He was Russian, a member of Sajudis and its MP in
the period 1990–1992.
46 “Self-government rights” are understood as granting a certain form of autonomy to national mi-
norities. “Special representation rights” are understood as a demand to guarantee a certain number of
seats in legislature to members of disadvantage and marginalised groups. W. Kymlicka (1995), pp. 27–30
and pp. 31–33.
litical and economic support for their language and culture. As a result, they would be disad-
vantaged and would opt to assimilate into the dominant culture. According to the Lithuanian
laws, they were granted “polyethnic” rights as individuals. However, the laws did not always
work in practice. For example some among the Poles argued that, whilst they had a right to
be educated in Polish, the state was not ready to invest in Polish schools.47 As a result, the
level of education continued to be low and some Poles chose to send their children to Lithua-
nian schools. However, the last statement contradicts the data which points out that both the
number of Poles attending full time general education and the number of schools were grow-
ing.48 With regard to “special representation rights”, according to the 1992 Electoral Law, the
national minority parties did not need to satisfy the threshold of 4 percent.49 Furthermore,
the Poles fought against the proposed changes of electoral boundaries for two reasons;
firstly, they wanted their opinion to be at least heard if not “amplified” and secondly, they
did not want to belong to the city of Vilnius. Because the city was growing so fast, they would
only be able to claim 0.2 hectares of their land back.50
Their argument for these two types of rights followed the argument put forward by Iris
Young51 and Kymlicka. The Poles argued that the state supported the majority culture. They
believed that cultures should be treated equally and fairly. If their language and culture were
not protected they would not be able to exercise their rights as individuals. They felt vulnera-
ble, firstly, because their language and culture were not adequately acknowledged and some-
times threatened, such as in the case where they were described ‘Polonised Lithuanians’.
Secondly, they did not have their own intelligentsia and did not see how, under contempo-
rary circumstances, it could be formed. They saw the intelligentsia as a vital element in con-
tinuing their life in Lithuania.
What is interesting is that the Jews did not discuss Lithuanian legislation in relation to
their community. The discussion always took place on a more abstract level. In the course of
my interviews, they expressed a general satisfaction with the legislation.52 They were focused
much more on Jewish problems, which were universally Jewish rather than Lithuanian Jew-
ish such as anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. The reasons for this were perhaps that, firstly,
they saw themselves as being too small a group to effect any change, secondly, they thought it
was not the right time to push for changes and thirdly, they did not see their future in Lithua-
nia. Except for a small number of them they were not willing to participate in Lithuanian af-
fairs.
Lithuanian political parties, in general, were not only satisfied but also proud of the
Lithuanian legislation. However, they insisted on their different perspectives. The right-wing
parties saw Lithuanian legislation as proof, not only of their democratic tradition and orien-
tation, but as concessions which they have had to make because of their undemocratic Soviet
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48 Lietuvos statistikos metrastis, 1996. Vilnius: Metodinis leidybinis centras, 1997, p. 478. Statisti-
cheskii Ezhegodnik Litvi, 1992. Vilnius: Department statistiki Litvi, 1993, pp. 25–126. Lithuania’s Stati-
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49 This law was changed for the 1996 elections and the threshold of 5 percent was introduced for all
political parties. See: K. Henderson and N. Robinson (1997) Post-communist Politics: An Introduction.
Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall, p. 330.
50 A. Lieven (1994), p. 168.
51 I. M. Young (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
52 Interview with S. Alperovich, 14 December 1992. He was a member of the Board of the Lithua-
nian Jewish Community, a lawyer.
past. The left-wing parties saw the legislation as proof that they were on the road towards de-
mocracy.53
Conclusion
The national minorities felt that the question of how to define a true Lithuanian also
had relevance to themselves. They had to find an answer to the question of who was a real
Russian, Pole or Jew. This issue was also important in relation to their duty towards the “Fa-
therland”. Although the majority of members of the national minorities felt that Lithuania
was their homeland, they wanted Lithuania to be a multicultural society. The obsession of
the Lithuanian national movement with Lithuanian history did not embrace the minorities’
histories on the territory of Lithuania. They were seen as endangering the existence of the
Lithuanian state, and this was particularly true of Polish culture. The Lithuanian national
movement felt uncomfortable with what they saw as the dominance of Polish culture, the as-
sociation of Russians with rulers and especially Soviet might, and finally the perceived insula-
tion of the Jewish community. Minorities’ histories in this land, throughout centuries, were
different. Therefore, there were different responses, demands and answers raised by the na-
tional minorities. An irony is that this perception of Polish culture, Soviet might and Jewish
closeness were all linked into the past. There were hardly any Jews left in Lithuania. The
Poles stressed the view that Polish culture had been destroyed in Soviet Lithuania. The So-
viet might threatened independent Lithuania up to 1991. However, despite the past nature of
these features, the Lithuanian national movement did not try to gain the support of its mi-
norities. On the contrary, its rhetoric became increasingly nationalistic. However, this rheto-
ric made the differences within the Lithuanian community more visible. Even more impor-
tantly, some of them expressed opposition against the nationalistic rhetoric and this was,
needless to say, welcomed by minorities.
A small number of the national minority population felt that during the Soviet era their
national identity was neglected because it was under the pressure of Sovietization. The Lith-
uanian national movement forcefully introduced the rest of this population to the nationality
question, which insisted on preserving differences among national groups. Therefore, all of
them had to face the question of who they were. This question was a painful issue for the ma-
jority of the national minority population especially because it was raised against a back-
ground which concentrated on celebrating the Lithuanian nation. The celebration of a collec-
tive ideal was a familiar process to these people but this time it was not the working class but
the nation which was elevated on a pedestal. Minorities were not included in this celebration.
Furthermore, Russians were addressed as “occupiers”, Poles were often called “Red Poles”
and Jews as well were reminded of their communist past. Ethnic differences were not appre-
ciated. The majority of national minorities were taken aback and confused. They did not
know how to approach the question of who they were. Most of the members of the minority
groups withdrew from public life and were passive. Passivity must be seen in relation to the
Soviet era as well as the result of the rise of Lithuanian nationalism. In both cases, passivity
was imposed on the minorities because they were marginalised by the majority. Those who
got involved, organised themselves into different types of organisations. Their choice of or-
ganisation was determined by their support for independent Lithuania and how they envis-
aged their cultural and economic future in this country.
In assessing the years from 1988 to 1993, one can see that this was a turbulent time for
national minorities in Lithuania. There was less and less respect for diversity and there was a
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tendency towards homogeneity. Whilst at the beginning of 1988 important steps towards the
establishment of the civil society had been established, from early 1990 onwards nationalist
rhetoric became more conspicuous and impeded such developments. People had been learn-
ing the language of civil society and had entered the space which was no longer covered by
the “big brother”. However, new cards were asked to be shown at the door; this time not of
the Communist Party but of national affiliation. In August 1993 the Soviet Army left Lithua-
nia. “Lithuania will be finally independent.” I heard from quite a few of my interviewees. As
my research pointed out, although the Lithuanian legislation complied with international
regulations, national minorities still had grievances which prevented them from becoming ac-
tive citizens.
Many of the issues raised by the national minorities continued to exist after 1993. How-
ever, they were no longer seen as conflicts but as matters which could be settled. Of course,
some conflicts have occurred, especially between the Poles and the two Lithuanian Govern-
ments (1992–1996 and one elected in 1996). However, they have not captured the attention
of the minority communities and Lithuanians on the same scale as they did in the late 1980’s
and early 1990’s. I would argue that this is primarily related to the mellowing of nationalistic
rhetoric. An important achievement of the LDDP Government was the policy of avoiding
conflicts as far as possible. As a result, the Russians have been increasingly integrating into
Lithuanian society. It is important to notice that before and during the impeachment process
to President Ronaldas Paksas, “Russia more than ever emerged as a threat to Lithuanian
sovereignty in the eyes of the political establishment and cultural elite.”54 However, this ap-
proach was not any longer extended to the Russians as it used to be in the past. The Jews still
raise the issue of the Holocaust but are ready to take a more active part in Lithuanian soci-
ety. The Poles continue to argue that their grievances concerning the land reform and the ex-
pansion of Vilnius have not been dealt with. However, they agree that the LDDP Govern-
ment made attempts to improve education in Polish. The period 1993 onwards has been a
period in which both the Lithuanian authorities and minority population have been learning
the language of democracy,55 which has entailed the coming to terms with differences and the
question of how to live with them. As Lauras Bielinis pointed out recently one can talk about
“two Lithuanias” but they are not any longer divided along ethnic lines but social.
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Fokus analize je na razumijevanju gra|anskih prava u praksi, kako su
bila percipirana od gra|ana i ostalih stanovnika. Analiza gra|anskih prava
unutar demokratskog okvira ne sastoji se samo od legalnih mehanizama nego
i od politi~ke kulture koja po{tuje razlike izme|u “nas” i “njih”. Taj tip poli-
ti~ke kulture nije bio razvijen u Litvi u periodu od 1988. do 1993. To je bio pe-
riod rasta nacionalizma i nacionalisti~kog pona{anja prema nacionalnim ma-
njinama i zbog toga je proizveo tenzije izme|u gra|anskog principa kao inklu-
zivnog i nacionalizma kao ekskluzivnog principa.
Klju~ne rije~i: DR@AVLJANSKA PRAVA, POLITI^KA KULTURA,
NACIONALNE MANJINE, LITVA
130
Popovski, V.: Nationalism and Citizenship... Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXXVII. (2006), No 3–4: 117–130
